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Neural Networks (NN s) are known to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. A malicious agent initiates these attacks by perturbing
an input into another one such that the two inputs are classified differently by the NN . In this paper, we consider a special class of
adversarial examples, which can exhibit not only the weakness of NN models—as do for the typical adversarial examples—but also the
different behavior between two NN models. We call them difference-inducing adversarial examples or DIAEs. Specifically, we propose
DAEGEN, the first black-box differential technique for adversarial input generation. DAEGEN takes as input two NN models of the
same classification problem and reports on output an adversarial example. The obtained adversarial example is a DIAE, so that it
represents a point-wise difference in the input space between the two NN models. Algorithmically, DAEGEN uses a local search-based
optimization algorithm to find DIAEs by iteratively perturbing an input to maximize the difference of two models on predicting the
input. We conduct experiments on a spectrum of benchmark datasets (e.g., MNIST, ImageNet, and Driving) and NN models (e.g., LeNet,
ResNet, Dave, and VGG). Experimental results are promising. First, we compare DAEGEN with two existing white-box differential
techniques (DeepXplore and DLFuzz) and find that under the same setting, DAEGEN is 1) effective, i.e., it is the only technique that
succeeds in generating attacks in all cases, 2) precise, i.e., the adversarial attacks are very likely to fool machines and humans, and
3) efficient, i.e., it requires a reasonable number of classification queries. Second, we compare DAEGEN with state-of-the-art black-box
adversarial attack methods (Simba and Tremba), by adapting them to work on a differential setting. The experimental results show
that DAEGEN performs better than both of them.
1 INTRODUCTION
In 2016, a Tesla vehicle, driving in autopilot mode, crashed against a white truck after it failed to identify the truck as an
obstacle (Vlasic and Boudette [2016]). Further investigation revealed that the autopilot system misclassified the truck as
a bright sky. The Tesla driver died in the crash. In 2018, a pedestrian was struck and killed by an Uber test vehicle after
it failed to recognize the obstacle as a human (Lubben [2018]). These are examples that illustrate the importance of
properly testing the software that controls these vehicles.
Neural networks (NN s) are computing systems capable of learning tasks from examples. NN s is the technology
used to control the vehicles mentioned above. They have been recently applied in various domains, including im-
age classification (Guo et al. [2017]), malware detection (Yeo et al. [2018]), speech recognition (Juang et al. [2007]),
medicine (Sengupta et al. [2016]), and vehicle control and trajectory prediction (Zissis et al. [2015]). NN s are known to
be vulnerable to adversarial attacks (Goodfellow et al. [2014b], Papernot et al. [2017], Szegedy et al. [2013]). A malicious
agent creates these attacks by finding a pair of similar inputs—typically, indistinguishable by the human eye—where
the NN produces different outputs, one of which is incorrect. With that knowledge, a malicious attacker can exploit
neural-network-bearing systems to perpetrate illicit acts. Adversarial attacks pose a significant threat to the reliability
of machine learning systems today. The Tesla and Uber accidents could have been prevented had the autonomous
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vehicles been tested against adversarial attacks. There exists intensive research on adversarial attacks and defences
today (See Chakraborty et al. [2018] and Huang et al. [2018] for recent surveys).
DIAEs. This paper focuses on a particular class of adversarial examples that can differentiate two NN models trained
on the same dataset. As Pei et al. [2017] we use the term DIAE (for Difference-Inducing Adversarial Examples) to refer to
this class of inputs. The study of the differential behaviour between two NN models has been motivated by the current
debate between the transferability of adversarial examples (Papernot et al. [2017]) and the fact that decision boundaries
of two models can be drastically different even if they are trained on the same dataset (Liu et al. [2017]). Because the
adversarial examples lie at decision boundaries, the difference on decision boundaries suggests the non-transferability
of adversarial examples. In this paper, instead of directly participating on this debate, we provide a technique and
corresponding tool to identify DIAEs, i.e., those adversarial examples that perform differently on the two models.
The discovery of a DIAE suggests a point-wise failure of transferability and a point-wise difference in the decision
boundaries of two NN models.
Black-box Attacks.White-box techniques exist to generate DIAEs (Pei et al. [2017]). We are interested in black-box
methods for its practicality. Black-box methods rely only on the input and outputs of the NN s to produce adversarial
examples. They do not need access to the gradients of a NN , which is the key ingredient used in white-box attacks,
including the most successful ones, such as C&W attack (Carlini and Wagner [2017]). In simple words, we run both
techniques on a single target NN , saving the adversarial inputs they generate. Then, we later select a second NN model
and check if the outputs of this model match the outputs of the target model on these adversarial inputs. We consider
the number of mismatches to be the number of difference inducing inputs.
Solution. This paper proposes DAEGEN, a lightweight black-box technique that leverages the diversity of different
NN s to generate adversarial attacks. DAEGEN is the first black-box technique to use Differential Testing (McKeeman
[1998]) to find DIAEs. For a given seed input x , DAEGEN searches for adversarial inputs x ′ that maximize the distance
between the outputs that the two models produce to x ′ (as to fool machines) while minimizing the distance between x
and x ′ (as to fool humans). We conjecture that the combination of these goals enables DAEGEN to produce high-quality
adversarial inputs efficiently. Although differential testing has been used in testing of NN s, specifically DeepXplore (Pei
et al. [2019]) and DLFuzz (Guo et al. [2018]), both of them are white-box. In addition, there are significant technical
differences between DAEGEN and these two methods. Unlike DAEGEN which finds DIAEs by minimising the difference
between predictive confidences of two NN models, DeepXplore focuses on neuron coverage—a metric of test adequacy–
and is designed to find DIAEs by ensuring that more neurons in one of the models are activated. In other words,
DeepXplore does not aim at exploring the different behavior between NN models–it explores the difference between
models to study adversarial behavior in one of the models. In contrast, DLFuzz takes a single model on input instead of
more than one, as DeepXplore and DAEGEN do. DLFuzz is not designed to work with DIAEs.
Summary of Evaluation. We conducted an extensive set of experiments to validate the performance of DAEGEN
by comparing it with state-of-the-art white-box (differential) techniques and black-box (non-differential) techniques.
A simple adaptation (details explained in Section 5) is needed to make those non-differential techniques work on
our differential setting. For white-box techniques, we compared DAEGEN against DeepXplore (Pei et al. [2019]) and
DLFuzz (Guo et al. [2018]). For black-box techniques, we compared DAEGEN against Simba (Guo et al. [2019]) and
Tremba (Huang and Zhang [2020]). We analyzed these techniques on three orthogonal dimensions: 1) effectiveness,
2) precision, and 3) efficiency. Effectiveness refers to the number of times a technique was successful in generating
DIAEs. Precision refers to the quality of the adversarial inputs generated. Intuitively, more similar inputs are preferable
as they are more difficult to catch by the human eye. Efficiency refers to the computation cost of the technique. We
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used three popular image datasets in the evaluation, namely, MNIST (Lecun et al. [1998]), ImageNet (Deng et al. [2009]),
and Driving (udacity challenge [2016]) and several NN models frequently used in the evaluation of related techniques.
Summary of Results. Considering the comparison with white-box techniques, DAEGEN was the only technique
capable of generating adversarial examples in all cases and it was the fastest technique. Considering the comparison with
black-box techniques, DAEGEN was able to produce DIAEs in 99.2% of the cases whereas Simba and Tremba produced
DIAEs on rates of 73.1% and 76.9%, respectively. Furthermore, DAEGEN produced images with much lower L2values
(i.e., Euclidean distance of the generated input to the seed image) than Tremba and slightly higher L2 values than Simba.
Overall, these results provide initial, yet strong evidence that our approach is effective to produce difference-inducing
inputs at higher rates.
This paper makes the following original contributions:
⋆ Technique. DAEGEN, the first black-box technique for finding DIAEs;
⋆ Tool. A publicly available tool implementing DAEGEN;
⋆ Evaluation. A comprehensive evaluation of DAEGEN including a variety of white- and black-box techniques,
datasets, andNN models. Experimental results indicate thatDAEGEN is effective, precise, and efficient. Evaluation
artifacts are publicly available at the following link https://github.com/daegen/DaegenAttack.
2 EXAMPLE
Consider that a manufacturer of an autonomous vehicle wants to test the robustness of the NN models before they are
deployed on their vehicles. The focus is on a specific NN that outputs a correction angle on the steering wheel based on
what it observes from the pictures that the front camera of the vehicle takes. For example, the NN would instruct the
vehicle to adjust the steering wheel’s angle to prevent the vehicle from falling off an approaching cliff. Other nets on
the vehicle could be used to monitor other environmental signals and to take other actions (e.g., whether or not to slow
down or stop). This example focuses on driving direction.
DAEGEN is a technique to test the robustness of an NN . It takes as input a seed object (e.g. an image) and two NN
models—the testing target and the surrogate model for the target. As a black-box technique, DAEGEN uses information
on the input and output of the net to search for examples. There are multiple ways to obtain surrogate models. First,
as shown by Papernot et al. [2016], a surrogate model can be created from scratch, by training over a set of training
data sampled from the model to be tested. Second, in some application domains, surrogate models may be available
off-the-shelf. For example, on benchmark datasets such as ImageNet, there exist many well-trained models publicly
available. The second way is becoming a trend in self-driving applications, with more and more benchmark datasets
released (e.g., Waymo’s Open Dataset (Waymo [2020])).
Figure 1 shows an example of an adversarial input produced by DAEGEN. The seed (original) input to test the NN
appears on the left-hand side of the figure. Note from the numbers below the image on the left that both the tested net
(NN1) and the surrogate net (NN2) produce a similar response to this input—a .19 degree to the right (as the angle is
positive). The angles are not identical; we only showed two decimals in the figure for space. The right side of the figure
illustrates a very similar, but not identical, image for which the tested network and the surrogate network differ, by a
considerable amount, on the result they produce. The network NN1 instructs the vehicle to go almost straight, whereas
the NN2 instructs the vehicle to steer to the right. Regardless of which network is incorrect, there exists a problem.
We remark that our focus is not on the differential behavior of the NN models on the original input, as studied
by Adamu et al. [2015], Johansson et al. [2007]. Instead, we study the different behavior of the NN models on the
4 João Batista Pereira Matos Júnior, Lucas Carvalho Cordeiro, Marcelo d’Amorim, and Xiaowei Huang
Fig. 1. Original and adversarial input.
perturbed inputs, as shown in the right-hand side of Figure 1. Our focus is on the different robustness capability of the
models and on identifying such adversarial inputs. A DIAE shows a difference in the robustness capability of two nets.
Unlike general adversarial examples, whose actual safety risk is arguable (Ilyas et al. [2019], Lu et al. [2017]), DIAEs,
which are special kinds of adversarial examples, represent an actual risk because they show a concrete manifestation of
disagreeement between two models.
DAEGEN uses a classical Hill-Climbing search (Russell and Norvig [2009]) to produce adversarial examples. It
1) randomly selects a pixel from the image, 2) makes random perturbations on that pixel, 3) queries the models and
measures fitness of the new image, and 4) stops if a sufficiently good adversarial input (according to fitness value)
has been produced or it reached a budget on the number of queries to the models. Otherwise, if there was no fitness
improvement, DAEGEN continues execution on step 1 with the image it initiated the current iteration. If there was
fitness improvement, it continues execution on step 1 with the image modified in the current iteration.
The sensible part of DAEGEN is the objective function it uses to search for examples. As a black-box technique,
DAEGEN only uses information available on the input and outputs. The objective function expresses two primary
goals: 1) to maximize the distance between the outputs produced by the test and the surrogate networks (0.21 in the
adversarial example above) and 2) to minimize the distance between the inputs. DAEGEN uses the Euclidean distance
between two images to that end. The rationale is that these two goals reflect the intention of an adversarial attack—to
fool machines (as per the first goal) and humans (as per the second goal).
3 PRELIMINARIES
This section introduces fundamental concepts and terminology used in the paper.
Adversarial attacks apply input generation methods to exploit NNs (Serban and Poll [2018], Yuan et al. [2017]).
Given an input x , the attacker goal is to look for another input x ′ such that one of the following objectives is satisfied:
confidence reduction (i.e., the confidence of classifying x ′ as a given label is reduced to a certain level), non-targeted
misclassification (i.e., x ′ is classified into any other label that is different from x), and targeted misclassification (i.e.,
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x ′ is classified into a given label that is different from x). Non-targeted and targeted attacks are specialized forms of
confidence reduction attacks. This paper focuses on non-targeted attacks.
Attack methods differ in how much access they have on the NN . Attacks can be white-box or black-box. A white-box
attacker has unlimited access to the NN . For example, the attacker knows the hyper-parameters, architecture, model
weights, data used to train the network model, and defense methods. Hence, the attacker can replicate the model under
attack. In particular, a white-box attacker can compute the gradient of loss for an input. The FGSM attack (Szegedy
et al. [2013]), for instance, leverages that information. In contrast, black-box attacks have limited access to the NN .
For a given input x , the attacker will only know the distribution of the output or partial information about the output
distribution, as discussed below. This paper proposes a black-box attack method.
While white-box attack are appealing and many attack methods use the gradients of a network, black-box attacks
have a practical edge. Existing literature describes three characteristics of black-box attacks (Ilyas et al. [2018]). The first
one is limited query, where the attacker may, for example, be limited to a small number of queries. Many commercial
or proprietary systems may limit the ability of the attacker to access its classifiers. This characteristic highlights the
importance of query efficiency in black-box attacks, thereby setting the ground for using the number of queries as a
metric of performance of the attack methods (see Section 5.1). The second characteristic is partial information. Attackers
may have access to only the top-k class probabilities when querying the model, instead of the probability distribution
of all classes. DAEGEN works with partial information; it only uses the top class from the probability distribution. Finally,
the third characteristic is label only, where the attackers cannot access the probability distributions. Instead, the only
information available is the top-k inferred labels. DAEGEN does not work with this characteristic as it needs both the
top-1 label and its probability.
3.1 Black-box attack formulation
We formally describe a black-box adversarial attack in the following. Consider that a NN model S is trained to classify
images into a set of k classes (i.e., labels). S can be formalized as a function:
f : Rd → [0, 1]k ,
where d is the number of input features. The output of function f is a probability distribution, representing the
probability of S classifying the input x into any of the k labels. Formally, when S is queried with the input image x, it
responds by returning a tuple containing, for example, label y ∈ 0...k and a probability P(y |x) ∈ 0..1. Non-targeted
misclassification can be formulated as an optimization problem (Pei et al. [2019]), as follows:
min
x ′∈Rd
∥x − x ′∥2 s.t. arg max
t ∈1..k
f (x) , arg max
t ∈1..k
f (x ′) (1)
The goal is to find an adversarial image x ′, where the difference between x and x ′ is minimized when the label
changes. Perturbation norms are used to define the acceptable distance between original and perturbed images (Bhambri
et al. [2019]). Specifically, the expression ∥x − x ′∥2 denotes the L2 (Euclidean) distance between the inputs x and x ′. In
addition to L2, L1 and L∞ are also commonly used. The right side of the equation expresses the condition that the label
needs to change for the attack to have an effect.
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Fig. 2. Overview of the DAEGEN‘s architecture.
4 A BLACK-BOX DIFFERENTIAL APPROACH FOR ADVERSARIAL INPUT GENERATION (DAEGEN)
This section describes DAEGEN, a black-box differential method to find adversarial inputs in NN s. Figure 2 summarizes
the workflow of DAEGEN. DAEGEN uses search to identify adversarial inputs in NN s. However, in contrast to state-of-
the-art white-box (differential) techniques, e.g., (Pei et al. [2019]) and (Guo et al. [2018]) and black-box (non-differential)
techniques, e.g., (Guo et al. [2019]) and (Huang and Zhang [2020]), DAEGEN is inspired by the recent success of
fuzzing (Godefroid [2020]), which is a highly effective, mostly automated, security testing technique. In particular, in
evolutionary black-box fuzzing, if a mutation of the input triggers a new execution path through the code, then it is an
exciting mutation; otherwise, the mutation is discarded. By producing random mutations of the input and observing
their effect on code coverage, evolutionary black-box fuzzing can learn what interesting inputs are. Based on this
observation, DAEGEN queries the NN s with given input and then makes perturbations (mutations) on the input based
on observations obtained from the previous queries (learning). This process is repeated until finding an adversarial
input or reaching a budget on the number of queries.
4.1 Attack formulation
Technically, DAEGEN systematically searches the input space to (i) maximize the output/output difference while (ii)
minimizing the input/input difference. The output/output difference consists of the difference between the outputs
produced by each NN . For example, for classification problems, NN s often reports probability distributions indicating
the likelihood of the input belonging to a given class. In those cases, DAEGEN maximizes the difference between the
two distributions reported. Simultaneously, DAEGEN minimizes the difference between the perturbed input and the
original input.
Formally, given two functions f1 and f2 and an input x , the optimization problem can be described as:
maxx ′∈Rd ∥ f1(x ′) − f2(x ′)∥1 s.t. ∥x − x ′∥p ≤ ϵ , arg max f1(x) , arg max f2(x ′). (2)
Intuitively, it is to find an adversarial example x ′ that maximizes the difference between outputs from f1 and f2, such
that x ′ is not too far away from x , and there exists a misclassification.
Consider the example illustrated in Figure 1 and the formalization in Eq. (2). One could apply an optimization
algorithm to randomly add noise patterns to the street road. This means that noises (or combinations of noises), which
maximize the difference between the output of NN1 and the output of a NN2 for the perturbed street road, will be kept
until the search algorithms find a feasible solution.
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4.2 Hill Climbing (HC) optimization
In order to solve the optimization problem in Eq. (2), Hill Climbing (HC) (Russell and Norvig [2009]), a mathematical
optimization technique suited for local search problems, is chosen. HC is an iterative algorithm that starts with an
arbitrary solution for a given problem, and at each iteration, it adds incremental alterations to the solution. The core
components of HC are described below:
• Selection. A new solution is generated by adding random mutation to a previously generated solution.
• Evaluation. The evaluation function calculates a score that measures the quality of a solution candidate.
• Termination. The algorithm terminates if the solution has converged, i.e., the algorithm is unable to produce
new solutions that are different from the previous solution.
Algorithm 1: Hill Climbing algorithm for difference inducing adversarial examples generation.
Data: Input original example x ; two target models NN1 and NN2 as black-box functions f1 and f2, respectively;
maximum number of allowed iterations T ; a constant c to re-scale the L2 value
Result: Output an adversarial example x ′ if any, or the best solution it could find before termination.
Function Selection(x ′):
1 pixelIndex← rand(0, len(x’))
2 x ′[pixelIndex] ← rand(0, 255)
return x
Function Evaluation(x ′):
return Ω(x ,x ′)
3 sol← Selection(x)
4 score← Evaluation(x)
5 i← 0
while ¬Termination(sol , i) do
6 newSol←Mutation(sol)
7 newScore← Evaluation(newSol)
if newScore > score then
8 sol← newSol
9 score← newScore
10 i← i+1
11 x’← sol
In Algorithm 1, we present our implementation of the HC algorithm for DAEGEN attack. This algorithm receives as
input four parameters as follows. a) x is the original image. b) y is the true label of x . c) f1 and f1 are two NN models
NN1 and NN2. d) T is the maximum number of iterations the algorithm is allowed to have. e) c is a constant factor that
we can use to re-scale the L2 value, and it is used during the evaluation step (see, Eq. (3)). This is important because we
need to make sure the L2 and the score derived from the difference between the NN are on the same scale to avoid
that algorithm gives to much importance to the perceptual aspect of our optimization (i.e., minimizing the difference
between the images), ignoring the differential aspect. On the other hand, if we set c = 0 we can make the algorithm
ignore the perceptual aspect of the optimization and focus only on maximizing the differential behavior of the NN s.
The basic intuition behind this is that the algorithm can only succeed if it is able to find difference inducing solutions,
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which is achieved by maximizing divergent behavior on the NN , while the L2 forces the algorithm to find solutions
that are closer to the original inputs. If that is not a need we can flex the importance of this aspect of the attacks. The
mutation function is responsible for adding pixel-level noises/perturbations to a given image x; it randomly selects a
single pixel from the image and modifies its original value by a new randomly generated value. A generated solution is
then evaluated by calculating a score using Eq. (3).
Ω(x ,x ′) = abs(f1(x ′) − f2(x ′)) − c ∗ norm(x ′ − x) (3)
5 EVALUATION
We organized the evaluation based on whether or not a technique leverages code of the NN to obtain adversarial inputs
(i.e., white- versus black-box) and whether or not a technique takes multiple NN models on input (i.e., differential
versus non-differential). Intuitively, our goal is to understand the impact of each of these aspects on the performance of
an adversarial input generation technique.
We pose the following questions:
• RQ1. How DAEGEN compares with White-box Differential techniques? (Section 5.2)
• RQ2. How DAEGEN compares with Black-box Non-differential techniques? (Section 5.3)
We conducted all experiments on a machine with two Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-8750H CPU @ 2.20GHz processor, 2208
Mhz, 6 Core(s), 12 Logical Processor(s), 32 GB of DDR4 memory, NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1070 GPU. We used Python
3.5.6, PyTorch 1.0.1, Torchvision 0.2.23, Keras 2.0.8, Tensorflow 1.10.0 and Windows 10 Pro OS.
The tool implementing DAEGEN and the scripts to reproduce our experimental results are publicly available at the
following link https://github.com/DAEGEN/DAEGENAttack.
5.1 Metrics
We evaluated techniques in three dimensions:
(1) effectiveness determines how successful a technique is in generating adversarial examples;
(2) precision determines the ability of generated examples to fool machines and humans;
(3) efficiency determines how computationally efficient a technique is.
The following sections explain the metrics used to assess effectiveness, precision, and efficiency.
5.1.1 Effectiveness. We used the Differential Success Rate (DSR) as proxy for effectiveness. This metric measures the
relative number of DIAEs (see Section 1), which a given technique produces on a pair of models. In the following,
we define how we computed DSR for differential and non-differential techniques. These definitions differ because
non-differential techniques take one NN model on input, in contrast with differential techniques, which take two. DSR
of Differential Techniques. LetM define the kind of a network model, and let X define the set of inputs (e.g., the set
of images). We define a differential technique as a function t : M ×M × X → Z2 = {0, 1}, where 1 indicates that the
technique was successful in producing an adversarial example, while 0 indicates otherwise. That function takes two
classification models inM and seed in X as input and produces an output indicating success or failure. In successful
attacks, for any pairs of modelsm1,m2 ∈ M , the following proposition must holdm1(x) ,m2(x), for any seed input
x ∈ X . The Differential Success Rate (DSR) of a differential technique t is obtained by comparing the outputs of any
two modelsm1,m2 ∈ M on a given set of seed inputs X0 ⊆ X . More formally, we define the DSR of a technique t
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with respect to two modelsm1 andm2 and inputs X0 as DSR(t ,m1,m2,X0) = 1|X0 | ×
∑X0
x t(m1,m2,x). X0, referred to
as DSR(t, X0), is obtained by computing the average DSR across all pairs of models inM . DSR of Non-Differential
Techniques.We included non-differential techniques in the evaluation. Unfortunately, the DSR formulation above is
inadequate for these techniques, as they take only one model on input. To circumvent that issue, we defined a differential
technique p, based on its non-differential technique t , to decide if the adversarial input produced by t is a DIAE (see
Section 1). Intuitively, p checks, for a given pair of models ⟨a,b⟩, whether or not the adversarial input produced by a
(non-differential) technique for the model a results in a different output when fed to b. The computation of DSR is as
described for a differential technique.
5.1.2 Precision. Given the impossibility to automatically quantify the ability of humans to perceive changes in a pair
of images (Rony et al. [2018]), it is common practice to adopt metrics of image similarity as a proxy of perception. We
used the Euclidean distance between two images – the L2 norm – to quantify image similarity. This norm has been
consistently used in prior related work.
5.1.3 Efficiency. We used time and number of queries submitted to the models to measure efficiency, which has been
shown to be important in some domains (Bhambri et al. [2019]).
5.2 White-box (Differential) Techniques
This section elaborates on the comparison of DAEGEN with white-box techniques.
5.2.1 Comparison Techniques. We selected two recently-proposed popular white-box differential techniques for
comparison – DeepXplore (Pei et al. [2017]) and DLFuzz (Guo et al. [2018]). DeepXplore introduced the concept
of neuron coverage criterion and was the first technique to use differential testing in this domain. It uses multiple
(similar) NN s to find discrepancies in results. The approach exploits the differential behavior of a set of NN s to generate
adversarial input images. The adversarial input generation problem is formalized as a joint optimization problem, where
the following objectives are considered: 1) to maximize output divergence and 2) to maximize neuron coverage. A
gradient ascent search strategy is used to create perturbations on inputs to maximize both objectives. We considered
three configurations of DeepXplore for comparison: Light, Occl, and Blackout. Similar to DeepXplore, DLFuzz is also
differential. However, DLFuzz does not require additional model(s) to find adversarial attacks. Instead of looking for
inconsistent behavior across many NN models, it looks for inconsistent classification within a single NN model. The
attack method assumes that the first classification given by the classifier for a given seed input is correct and takes it as
ground truth. An adversarial attack is reported if the technique can produce similar inputs with different classification.
5.2.2 Datasets and Models. We used two image datasets in the evaluation: MNIST (Lecun et al. [1998]) and Driv-
ing (udacity challenge [2016]). MNIST is a dataset of handwritten digits, which contains 70K grayscale 28×28 (in pixels)
images, divided into ten classes, i.e., digits 0–9. Driving is a dataset made available by the Udacity self-driving car
challenge. It contains 5, 614 images captured by a self-driving car labeled with the steering wheel angle that should be
applied by the driver at the time each image was captured.
Table 1 shows the datasets and models we used. We focused on datasets and models 1) used in the evaluation of both
DeepXplore and DLFuzz and 2) used in the autonomous-vehicle domain.
5.2.3 Setup. We set a budget of 50K queries on DAEGEN to give it enough time to generate adversarial examples.
Recall that DAEGEN stops when the first adversarial example is produced. In that case, the budget is not reached.
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Table 1. Datasets and Models used for comparison of DAEGEN with White-Box techniques.
Datasets Model (Source) Used at
MNIST
LeNet1 (Lecun et al. [1998])
Guo et al. [2018], Pei et al. [2017]LeNet4 (Lecun et al. [1998])
LeNet5 (Lecun et al. [1998])
Driving
Dave-orig (Bojarski et al. [2016])
Pei et al. [2017]Dave-norminit (Simonyan and Zisserman [2014])
Dave-dropout (Simonyan and Zisserman [2014])
Such a high number of queries enables us to understand the actual cost of DAEGEN better. DeepXplore and DLFuzz,
unlike DAEGEN, can produce multiple adversarial examples for a given input. To fairly compare these techniques with
DAEGEN, we recorded only the first adversarial example they generate for a given input seed. Note that number of
attacks per input is irrelevant for DSR, which focuses on whether or not an attack was successful.
We followed usage instructions from DeepXplore [dxr, 2020] and DLFuzz [dlf, 2020]; we did not change any part
of their code. DeepXplore and DLFuzz offer command-line parameters to stop when the first example is found. This
methodology ensures that when any of these tools stop, they either succeed in generating adversarial inputs or fail due
to their limitations.
5.2.4 Results. Table 2 summarizes the results of each technique. We grouped results by datasets (see Table 1). Recall
that DLFuzz cannot handle the Driving dataset as is and we chose not to change the code (see Section 5.2.1). Observe
that, for “DSR” (effectiveness), the higher the value the better, whereas for “Avg. L2” (precision) and “Avg. Time (s)”
(efficiency), the lower the value the better.
Table 2. Average results comparing DAEGEN and White-Box techniques: DeepXplore (three variants) (Pei et al. [2017]) and DL-
Fuzz (Guo et al. [2018]).
Dataset Technique DSR L2 Time (s)
MNIST
DeepXplore light 0.732 14.034 5.573
DeepXplore occl 0.831 5.029 6.477
DeepXplore blackout 0.624 1.041 7.321
DLFuzz 0.918 2.611 5.205
DAEGEN 1.0 6.691 0.4
Driving
DeepXplore light 0.366 90.055 11.006
DeepXplore occl 0.927 60.680 8.683
DeepXplore blackout 0.070 25.765 9.271
DAEGEN 1.0 7.082 4.939
Results indicate that the DeepXplore blackout combination was the one that performed best in the MNIST, where it
produced examples with lower L2. However, that combination failed to produce examples in several cases. Overall,
DLFuzz performed well on the MNIST dataset since it produced adversarial examples in 91.8% of the cases, and the
examples have relatively low L2 values. Results show that DAEGEN generated adversarial examples in every case and
that it was more efficient than every other technique. The average L2 norm of (the examples produced by) DAEGEN is
not always superior to other techniques’ L2. For example, three techniques on the MNIST dataset produce examples with
lower average L2 than DAEGEN. The reason is that the setup we used for DAEGEN weighs efficiency (i.e., execution
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time) higher than precision (i.e., L2). In principle, all techniques could produce examples with lower L2 by executing
each query until reaching execution bounds instead of stopping on the first adversarial example produced. However,
that setup would lead to higher execution times, as we did. We elaborate and discuss the importance of L2 in the
following.
Effectiveness. Table 3 shows the breakdown of DSR per NN model. The columns under “DSR” show the DSR of a
technique for a given pair of the dataset (column “Dataset”) and model. Note that DeepXplore and DLFuzz perform
relatively well when considering DSR alone. The highlighted cells show the best DSR obtained below 1.0. Overall, DLFuzz
performed well on the MNIST dataset, whereas DeepXplore occl performed well on Driving. Recall that DAEGEN can
produce adversarial examples in every case.
Table 3. DSR breakdown.
Dataset Technique DSR
LeNet1 LeNet4 LeNet5
MNIST
DeepXplore light 0.697 0.703 0.796
DeepXplore occl 0.839 0.845 0.806
DeepXplore blackout 0.623 0.596 0.650
DLFuzz 0.933 0.893 0.929
DAEGEN 1.0 1.0 1.0
Dave-Orig Dave-Drop Dave-Norm
Driving
DeepXplore light 0.212 0.451 0.435
DeepXplore occl 1.00 1.00 0.782
DeepXplore blackout 0.005 0.091 0.115
DAEGEN 1.0 1.0 1.0
Precision. Figure 3 shows the distributions of L2 associated with each technique and dataset. Each bar indicates
the number of adversarial examples generated (y axis) for a given range of L2 values (x axis). Overall, the results of
DeepXplore on L2 are not consistent. For example, for the MNIST dataset, DeepXplore occl and blackout produced
examples with lower L2 values than DAEGEN. On the Driving dataset, however, every configuration of DeepXplore
produced examples with high L2 values. Considering the distribution of DLFuzz on the MNIST dataset, note that most
examples have L2 in the 2.6-2.7 range, which is relatively low.
DAEGEN produced examples in both datasets with similar values for L2. Compared to the DeepXplore combinations
on the Driving dataset, DAEGEN produced examples with considerably smaller L2 values. However, it produced
examples with high L2 values on the MNIST dataset. Three reasons justify that result. First, the number of queries
DAEGEN uses to produce an attack influences on L2—a higher number of queries produces more noise on an image.
We observed that the Pearson’s correlation between the number of queries and L2 was, in fact, moderate (∼0.6). Second,
DAEGEN generates noise with values ranging in the 0-255 interval. If a noised pixel has a value that is distant from the
original pixel value (e.g., the original pixel value is 0 and the noised pixel value is 255), this difference is likely to result
in a higher L2 value. In contrast, DeepXplore and DLFuzz use other criteria to determine the range of perturbation. For
example, DeepXplore uses a loss function based on the gradients of the NN to determine the range of perturbation.
Third, DAEGEN stops when the search finds the first adversarial example for a given seed input.
It is important to note that it remains an open research problem the identification of a threshold for a given norm
(e.g., L2) below which a human would unlikely be able to detect differences in a pair of images (Rony et al. [2018]). In
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(a) MNIST
(b) Driving
Fig. 3. L2 distributions per dataset.
other words, high L2 values do not necessarily invalidate an adversarial input. Figure 4 shows inputs that DAEGEN
creates, with increasing values of L2 from left to right, to illustrate that.
The first row shows example images from the MNIST dataset with L2 values of 1, 2, 5 and 10, respectively. The
impact of perturbations as the norm increases is noticeable in this case. In contrast, the impact of the perturbations is
less noticeable on the ImageNet example (Deng et al. [2009]), on the second row, and the Driving example, on the third
row. For comparison, the four images of a drake duck have associated L2 values of 5, 10, 50, and 100, respectively. To
sum up, human perception is not a function of L2 alone. The resolution of the image also plays a role in that.
Efficiency. Figure 5 shows the distributions of time (as histograms) associated with the execution of each technique on
each dataset. As expected for a black-box technique, DAEGEN is significantly more efficient than white-box alternatives.
Summary: We compared DAEGEN with two other differential techniques (DeepXplore and
DLFuzz) on two datasets (MNIST and Driving) and various NN models. DAEGEN was the only
technique to generate adversarial examples in all cases analyzed and was the fastest technique.
The norms of the examples created are relatively low.
5.3 Black-box (Non-differential) Techniques
This section elaborates on the comparison of DAEGEN with black-box techniques.
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Fig. 4. Adversarial examples created for a given seed image with increasing L2 values.
5.3.1 Comparison Techniques. We selected two state-of-the-art black-box non-differential techniques for comparison
with DAEGEN, namely Simba (Guo et al. [2019]) and Tremba (Huang and Zhang [2020]). Simba searches for adversarial
inputs using the L2 norm as DAEGEN does. At each search iteration, Simba samples a vector from a predefined
orthonormal basis and either adds that vector or subtracts it to the target image. Tremba is a technique that relies on
the transferability property of neural networks (Dong et al. [2019]) to perform adversarial attacks. First, it learns a
low-dimensional embedding using a pre-trained model. Then, it performs an efficient search within the embedding
space to attack an unknown target network. The method is query efficient and achieves high success rates, thereby
producing adversarial perturbations with high-level semantic transferable patterns. The tools implementing these
techniques are available from open-source repositories. We used the most recent version of the code and only updated
versions of libraries (e.g., PyTorch) to assure that the techniques perform at their best.
5.3.2 Datasets and Models. We used the ImageNet (Deng et al. [2009]) dataset in the evaluation. ImageNet is a large
image dataset, containing nearly 15 million images divided into 22K classes. As the original dataset is no longer publicly
available, we used the dataset made available by Huang et al. in the evaluation of Tremba 1 (Huang and Zhang [2020]).
This reduced dataset contains 22K images, with one image per class. Table 4 shows the datasets and models used in the
evaluation.
1Available at https://github.com/TransEmbedBA
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Fig. 5. Time distributions per dataset.
Table 4. Benchmarks and Models used for comparison with Black-Box techniques.
Datasets Model (Source) Used at
ImageNet
Densenet121 (Huang et al. [2017])
Huang and Zhang [2020]MobilenetV2 (Sandler et al. [2018])ResNet34 (He et al. [2016])
VGG16 (Simonyan and Zisserman [2014])
VGG19 (Simonyan and Zisserman [2014])
In contrast with the comparison against white-box techniques, this experiment only uses one dataset. The rationale
is that we found that the implementation of Tremba and Simba depend on the format of files they accept on input. For
example, Simba performs algebraic operations on 3-dimensional matrices, representing the images. These operations
are invalid on 2-dimensional matrices, such as those from the MNIST dataset. In principle, changing the implementation
of these tools to consider different formats is possible. However, we preferred to discard additional datasets instead of
changing the code of the tools, as the later could result in the introduction of bias in the evaluation. We used models
commonly used to evaluate the performance of input generation techniques on this dataset.
5.3.3 Setup. Every technique uses a budget of 10K queries to search for an adversarial input, stops when it finds the
first adversarial input, and runs on the same set of 100 randomly selected images from the ImageNet dataset. We used
the same number of queries used in prior work and chose 100 as the number of seed images to finish the execution
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of experiments in an acceptable time. Considering this setup, our script runs the experiments in approximately 21h
–DAEGEN runs for 10h08m, Simba runs for 7h22m, and Tremba runs for 3h22m. We ran the techniques according to
the guidelines for replicating their experimental results (sim [2020], tre [2020]) and calculated DSR according to the
definition from Section 5.1. Recall that to compare DAEGEN (differential) with Simba and Tremba (non-differential), we
created a pipeline of two NN s to simulate differential behavior for the non-differential techniques.
5.3.4 Results. Table 5 summarizes results. The DSR of Simba and Tremba are similar and considerably lower than that
of DAEGEN, which was successful in generating adversarial inputs in 99.2% of the cases. Simba produced images with
the lowest L2 among the techniques and Tremba produced images with the highest L2, almost twice as high as for the
images that DAEGEN produced. Considering the number of queries to the models, DAEGEN required a higher number
of queries but that number is well below the 10K budget.
Table 5. Average results comparing DAEGEN and Black-Box techniques: Simba (Guo et al. [2019]) and Tremba (Huang and Zhang
[2020])
Dataset Technique DSR L2 #Queries
MNIST
Simba 0.731 3.147 559.0
Tremba 0.769 11.221 424.1
DAEGEN 0.992 5.900 949.8
Effectiveness. Recall that DAEGEN is a differential technique. It produces DIAEs (see Section 1) on output. Existing
black-box techniques are non-differential; they do not produce DIAEs on output. DSR enables us to compare effectiveness
of these techniques on the same grounds and, consequently, circumvent this problem. Section 5.1 defines DSR for
differential and non-differential techniques. In both cases, DSR evaluates effectiveness of a technique on a pair of models.
Non-differential DSR checks, for a given pair of models ⟨a,b⟩, whether or not the adversarial input produced by a
(non-differential) technique for the model a results in a different output when fed to b. Effectively, DSR measures the
ability of each technique to produce DIAEs.
Table 6 shows DSR values obtained by each technique for every pair of model combination. The dashes on the
DAEGEN section of the table indicate that DAEGEN produces the same results regardless of the order of input models.
For example, the result of DAEGEN on the pair ⟨Densenet121, MobilenetV2⟩ is the same as ⟨MobilenetV2, Densenet121⟩.
As results show, considering the ability to generate DIAEs, DAEGEN is superior to Tremba and Simba in every one of
the 20 combinations of models we analyzed. In 10 combinations DAEGEN had a perfect DSR score. In the rest of the
combinations, DAEGEN obtained a score of no less than 97.7%. In contrast, Tremba produced a DSR score above 90% in
only one of the combinations: ⟨VGG16, MobilenetV2⟩.
Precision Figure 6 shows the distributions of the L2 norm for each technique. Note that Simba produces examples
with the lowest values of L2, but it produces less examples compared to DAEGEN.
Efficiency. Figure 7 shows the distributions of number of queries for each technique. Results indicate that DAEGEN
required a higher number of queries compared to alternative techniques.
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Table 6. DSR values for black-box techniques for every pair of model combination.
Networks Densenet121 MobilenetV2 ResNet34 VGG16 VGG19
Simba
Densenet121 NA 0.769 0.733 0.765 0.765
MobilenetV2 0.822 NA 0.842 0.839 0.835
ResNet34 0.719 0.696 NA 0.711 0.700
VGG16 0.744 0.700 0.728 NA 0.731
VGG19 0.649 0.628 0.638 0.613 NA
Tremba
Densenet121 NA 0.817 0.779 0.820 0.820
MobilenetV2 0.792 NA 0.828 0.883 0.883
ResNet34 0.766 0.815 NA 0.712 0.661
VGG16 0.807 0.909 0.767 NA 0.486
VGG19 0.807 0.883 0.704 0.445 NA
DAEGEN
Densenet121 NA 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
MobilenetV2 — NA 1.0 0.989 0.989
ResNet34 — — NA 0.988 0.988
VGG16 — — — NA 0.977
VGG19 — — — — NA
Fig. 6. Distributions of L2.
Fig. 7. Distributions of number of queries.
Summary: We compared DAEGEN with two other black-box techniques (Simba and Tremba) on
their ability to produce DIAEs. We used a popular dataset (ImageNet) and five NN models in
the comparison. DAEGEN was able to produce DIAEs in 99.2% of the cases whereas Simba and
Tremba produced DIAEs on rates of 73.1% and 76.9%, respectively. Considering the norm,
DAEGEN produced images with much lower L2 values than Tremba and slightly higher values
than Simba.
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5.4 Threats to Validity
As is the case of most empirical evaluations, there are external, internal, and construct threats to the validity of the
experimental results we reported.
External. As usual, the extent of generalization of results are limited to the observations we obtained from our data,
including the datasets, models, and techniques we selected in this study. To mitigate this threat, we carefully selected
a wide variety of datasets and models available for the corresponding task. We analyzed the MNIST, ImageNet, and
Driving datasets, which are popular in this domain. The models we selected are commonly used to evaluate related
techniques, use different architectures, and were pretrained on the corresponding datasets. Note that there is an
increasing variety of NN architectures available in the literature. We focused on models previously trained and used for
evaluating related techniques. Considering the techniques, we selected the state-of-the-art in research. We focused on
differential white-box techniques (namely, DeepXplore (Pei et al. [2017]) and DLFuzz (Guo et al. [2018])) as to evaluate
the impact of the black-box contribution and on non-differential black-box techniques (namely, Simba [Guo et al., 2019]
and Tremba (Huang and Zhang [2020])) as to evaluate the impact of the differential contribution.
Internal. As typical for a human activity (coding), the implementation of DAEGEN or the scripts we used to evaluate
DAEGEN could have (unintentional) problems. To mitigate this issue, the authors cross-checked the results reported in
this section. Every author analyzed the data individually and pointed to incoherences when they appeared.
Construct. As usual, the plausibility of the metrics we used to evaluate DAEGEN could be questioned. We evaluated
DAEGEN on effectiveness, precision, and efficiency as we consider these key quality indicators of an input generation
technique. Considering effectiveness, we measured the ability of techniques to produce DIAEs, which is the central goal
of our technique. To fairly compare non-differential with differential techniques, we needed to simulate differential
behavior, as described on Section 5.1.1. We made our best to fairly evaluate black-box (non-differential) techniques and
we believe the evaluation is valuable, but these techniques were not designed for that purpose. Considering precision,
there are different norms in the literature to evaluate image similarity. The Euclidean distance (L2) is the most popular
norm in related research.
6 RELATEDWORK
This section discusses most related work.
6.1 Black-box Input Generation
There are three main categories of adversarial attacks: white-box, gray-box, and black-box (Serban and Poll [2018]) (Xu
et al. [2019]). Many white-box techniques have been proposed recently in the literature. These technique typically
use a gradient search to generate adversarial examples (e.g., Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al.
[2014b]), Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) (Carlini and Wagner [2017]) (Madry et al. [2017]), and L∞ Basic Iterative
Attack (Kurakin et al. [2016])). See Yuan et al. [2017] and Zhang and Liang [2019] for a survey of techniques. A white-box
attack is better suited when the attacker has access to the implementation of the NN , which is more likely to occur
during the development and testing phases. Once the model is deployed, it can be seen as a black-box system (Yuan et al.
[2017]), making it hardly practical to apply white-box approaches. It is also worth noting that techniques have been
recently proposed to defend against gradient-based attacks. Such defenses can manipulate the gradients performing
gradient masking or obfuscation (Alzantot et al. [2019]) (Athalye et al. [2018]). In a gray-box setting, the attacker
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has some knowledge about the target network (e.g., architecture, train dataset, or defenses mechanism), but not the
gradients. In a black-box setting, the target model is available as a black-box function. Therefore, the attacker is oblivious
to critical and essential information about the target model. This is a realistic characterization of the availability of NN
models in the real-world. (Serban and Poll [2018]) describe adversarial examples and a threat model for this kind of
attack.
Most existing approaches of black-box attacks are considered ineffective since they require hundreds of thousands of
queries to the model to generate a single adversarial example (Chen et al. [2017]) (Mosli et al. [2019]). Depending on
the model, this could be time-consuming and rely on substantial computational power, therefore, making the attack not
practical. Another disadvantage is that some methods often propose the design and implementation of a surrogate model
to approximate the decision boundary of the target NN and then apply gradient-descent optimization on the surrogate
model, which is also the case in white-box settings (Huang and Zhang [2020]). However, in a black-box setting, the
limited number of queries makes these approaches hard to apply as the surrogate model has to, in broad terms, learn the
outputs of the target model. Also, training a surrogate model can be challenging due to the complexity and non-linearity
in the classification rules, which can degrade the performance of black-box methods (Tu et al. [2019]). Also, it has been
found that adversarial training (i.e., using adversarial examples to retrain the model (Ilyas et al. [2019])) combined with
gradient-descent techniques (e.g., FGSM and PGD) makes NN models more robust to white-box attacks (Tramèr et al.
[2018]). By inference, this combination can be the case of surrogate-based black-box attacks. The implication of this is
that models submitted to adversarial training may be robust to surrogate techniques. However, it can still be affected by
adversarial examples generated by black-box techniques (Tramèr et al. [2018]), e.g., those that apply local or global
search meta-heuristics to generate adversarial examples.
6.2 Differential Testing
Pei et al. [2019] proposed DeepXplore, a white-box testing framework for large-scale deep learning systems. DeepXplore
formulates search as a joint optimization problem of generating inputs that maximize neuron coverage and maximize
the differential behaviors (or merely the differences) of multiple similar DL systems. Besides the white vs. black box
differences, DeepXplore and DAEGEN formulate different optimization problems. DeepXplore maximizes differential
behavior across various neural nets, while DAEGEN considers only two neural networks during the attack.
The solution proposed by Papernot et al. [2017] also involves multiple models. Their solution builds on the concept
of transfer-based attacks, i.e., the adversarial examples crafted for the surrogate models can be then used to attack
other models. The adversarial examples prepared by DAEGEN were not tested against other models besides the models
involved in the attack. We can only say that, in some cases, it can attack both models in the attack configuration, but in
the other cases, it can only attack one of the models.
6.3 Optimization-based Adversarial Example Generation
In recent studies, we note the use of optimization techniques to generate adversary examples. In these studies, there
exists some concern in minimizing the amount of queries needed to rediscover the attack until an adverse example
is produced. (Chen et al. [2019]) and (Alzantot et al. [2019]) have proposed genetic algorithms. In the first work, a
new optimized black-box attack was proposed, based on the genetic algorithm (POBA-GA), capable of generating
approximate optimal opponents through evolutionary operations, including initialization, selection, crossover, and
mutation. In the second work, a new gradient-free optimization technique (GenAttack) that uses genetic algorithms to
generate adversary examples was proposed. GenAttack can successfully attack some advanced defense techniques for
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ImageNet, suggesting that evolutionary algorithms are promising in promoting black-box attacks. Both works perform
targeted attacks (while DAEGEN only performs non-targeted attacks) and formulate their optimization problem as
a multi-objective optimization problem, where they try to maximize the probability P(y|X) for a specified y. (Chen
et al. [2019]) also try to minimize the difference between the original image and the adversarial image, and (Alzantot
et al. [2019]) try to minimize the probability of P(¬y |X ). Therefore, the difference between theses threat models and
DAEGEN relies on the fact that it solves the optimization problem by trying to maximize the difference between the
probability P(y |X )a and the probability P(y |X )b , for a pair of modelsMa andMb respectively.
Other more sophisticated techniques such as Zeroth Order Optimization have been applied in (Chen et al. [2017]) and
(Cheng et al. [2019]). Particle swarm optimization (PSO) is present in the works (Mosli et al. [2019]) and (Zhang et al.
[2019]). PSO can quickly converge on sufficiently good solutions with few queries. Like the Genetic Algorithm, PSO
also requires the design of fitness function. Both (Mosli et al. [2019]) and (Zhang et al. [2019]) opt for fitness functions
that are equations containing the output of the network for a given particle (possible adversarial solution) and the L2
norm of the original image and the particle.
Although many meta-heuristics optimization approaches have natural methods to randomly introduce small noises
and perturbations into inoffensive image samples in their search for feasible (or optimal) solutions, we must mention
that they are not the only options. Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) (Goodfellow et al. [2014a]) are also viable
options to generate candidate solutions for the optimization algorithms (Xiao et al. [2018]) (Fang et al. [2019]). Bayesian
optimization (Shukla et al. [2019]) and random fuzzing (Zhang et al. [2019]) are also interesting approaches for black-box
attacks. However, these techniques are usually a more sophisticated solution for the adversarial generation problem.
For the sake of simplicity, we chose to apply custom implementations of search-based optimization techniques, namely,
Hill Climbing, with minimal modifications to satisfy our attack-method requirements.
7 CONCLUSIONS
We presented DAEGEN, a black-box method to exploit differential behavior between two neural networks by finding
difference-inducing adversarial examples (DIAEs) that maximize their output difference (under constraints on the
perturbation). We conducted a comprehensive set of experiments to evaluate DAEGEN. We considered existing white-
box methods that can generate DIAEs and then adapted existing black-box methods to work on DIAEs. Our experiments
show the superiority of DAEGEN over all of them in terms of effectiveness, precision, and efficiency.
We compared DAEGEN with two other differential techniques (DeepXplore and DLFuzz) on two datasets (MNIST
and Driving) and various NN models. DAEGEN was the only technique to generate adversarial examples in all cases
analyzed and was the fastest technique. Besides, we compared DAEGEN with two other non-differential black-box
techniques (Simba and Tremba) on their ability to produce DIAEs. We used a popular dataset (ImageNet) and five NN
models in the comparison. We found that DAEGEN was able to produce DIAEs in 99.2% of the cases, whereas Simba
and Tremba produced DIAEs on rates of 73.1% and 76.9%, respectively.
Our findings can help in the development of techniques to test, evaluate, and ensure robustness of neural networks
against black-box adversarial attacks, especially in security-critical domains. Future work will focus on improving DSR
to achieve a 100% success rate and validating our approach against known defense methods. It will also be a natural
next step to see whether DAEGEN can be used to support explainable AI. We believe that a good explanation of neural
network behavior may be achievable through identifying the differences between neural networks.
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